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Abstract
We consider a refinement of differential privacy — per instance differential privacy (pDP), which
captures the privacy of a specific individual with respect to a fixed data set. We show that this is
a strict generalization of the standard DP and inherits all its desirable properties, e.g., composition,
invariance to side information and closure to postprocessing, except that they all hold for every instance
separately. When the data is drawn from a distribution, we show that moments of per-instance DP
imply generalization. Moreover, we provide explicit calculations of the per-instance DP for the output
perturbation on a class of smooth learning problems. The result reveals an interesting and intuitive fact
that an individual has stronger privacy if he/she has small “leverage score” with respect to the data set
and if he/she can be predicted more accurately using the leave-one-out data set. Simulations show several
orders-of-magnitude more favorable privacy and utility trade-off when we consider the privacy of only the
users in the data set. In a case study on differentially private linear regression, we provide a novel analysis
of the One-Posterior-Sample (OPS) estimator and show that when the data set is well-conditioned it
provides (, δ)-pDP for any target individuals and matches the exact lower bound up to a 1 + O˜(n−1−2)
multiplicative factor. We also demonstrate how we can use a “pDP to DP conversion” step to design
AdaOPS which uses adaptive regularization to achieve the same results with (, δ)-DP.
1 Introduction
While modern statistics and machine learning had seen amazing success, their applications to sensitive
domains involving personal data remain challenging due to privacy issues. Differential privacy (DP) (Dwork
et al., 2006) is a mathematical definition that provides strong provable protection to individuals and prevents
them from being identified by an arbitrarily powerful adversary. DP has been increasingly popular within
the machine learning community as a solution to the aforementioned problem (McSherry & Mironov, 2009;
Chaudhuri et al., 2011; Liu et al., 2015; Abadi et al., 2016). The strong privacy protection, however, comes
with a steep price to pay. Differential privacy often leads to a substantial and sometimes unacceptable drop
in utility, e.g., in contingency tables (Fienberg et al., 2010) and in genome-wide association studies (Yu et al.,
2014). This motivated a large body of research to focus on making differential privacy more practical (Nissim
et al., 2007; Dwork & Lei, 2009; Sheffet, 2015; Wang et al., 2015; Dwork & Rothblum, 2016; Bun & Steinke,
2016; Foulds et al., 2016) by exploiting local structures and/or revising the privacy definition.
The majority of these approaches adopt a “privacy-centric” model, which involves theoretically proving that
an algorithm is differentially private for any data sets (within a data domain), then carefully analyzing the
utility of the algorithm under additional assumptions on the data set. For instance, in statistical estimation,
it is often assumed that the data is drawn i.i.d. from a family of distributions. In nonparametric statistics
and statistical learning, the data are often assumed to having specific deterministic/structural conditions, e.g.,
smoothness, incoherence, eigenvalue conditions, low-rank, sparsity and so on. While these assumptions are
strong and sometimes unrealistic, they are often necessary for a model to work correctly, even without privacy
constraints. Take high-dimensional statistics for example, “sparsity” is never really true in applications, but if
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the true model is dense and unstructured, then information-theoretically no methods can estimate the true
model anyway in the “small n large d” regime. That is why Friedman et al. (2001) argued that one should
“bet on sparsity” regardless and only expect the method to work when the input data is well-approximated by
a sparse model. Behind this informal “bet on sparsity” principle, is the pursuit for adaptivity in modeling and
algorithm design. We say an algorithm is adaptive1 if it can automatically adapt to favorable properties of
each input data set and perform better.
These conditions on the data set can also have a profound impact on a DP algorithm’s privacy guarantee.
As we know, DP quantifies its privacy guarantee with a single nonnegative number  — the privacy loss.
Smaller  implies stronger privacy guarantee. DP algorithms are designed to calibrate itself according to a
prescribed budget of , and to achieve -DP (or (, δ)-DP) regardless of what the input data is. This concise
data-independent privacy loss  is one of DP’s most attractive feature as it makes DP universally applicable.
But in many real-world applications,  is often an overly simplified summary and a crude upper bound of the
actual privacy loss incurred to individuals in the data set. An algorithm A that is calibrated to achieve a
privacy loss of  = 10 on the worst pair of adjacent data sets, could imply a much stronger privacy level of
′ = 0.1 when A is applied to a particular data set in which some of the additional assumptions are true. In
this case, it will be too conservative to quantify the actual privacy loss with just  = 10.
The extent to which DP is conservative, however, is highly problem-dependent. In cases such as releasing
counting queries, DP’s  clearly measures the correct information leakage, since the sensitivity of such queries
do not change with respect to the two adjacent data sets; however, in the context of machine learning and
statistical estimation (as we will show later), the  of DP can be orders of magnitude larger than the actual
amount of information leakage that comes with the release. That is part of the reason why in practice, it
is challenging even for experts of differential privacy to provide a consistent recommendation on standard
questions such as:
“What is the value of privacy budget  I should set in my application?”
In this paper, we take a new “algorithm-centric” approach of analyzing privacy and address a related but
different question:
“What is the privacy loss  incurred to an individual z when A(Z) is released?”
Instead of designing algorithms that take the privacy budget  as an input, we start with a fixed randomized
algorithm A2 and then analyze its privacy protection for every pair of adjacent data sets separately. This is
equivalent to treating  as a function parameterized by each problem instance — a Dataset-Target pair. 
as a function provides a more fine-grained description of the randomized algorithm compared to using only
the privacy loss  of its DP guarantee, i.e., the maximum of (Dataset,Target) over all pairs of datasets and
individuals.
Our contribution is threefold.
1. First, we develop per-instance differential privacy as a strict generalization of the standard pure and
approximate DP. It provides a more fine-grained description of the privacy protection for each target
individual and a fixed data set. We show that it inherits many desirable properties of differential privacy
and can easily recover differential privacy for a given class of data and target users.
2. Secondly, we quantify the per-instance sensitivity in a class of smooth learning problems including linear
and kernel machines. The result allows us to explicitly calculate per-instance DP of a multivariate
Gaussian mechanism. For an appropriately chosen noise covariance, the per-instance DP is proportional
to the norm of the pseudo-residual in norm specified by the Hessian matrix. In particular, in linear
regression, the per-instance sensitivity for a data point is proportional to its square root statistical
leverage score (predictive variance) and its leave-one-out prediction error (predictive bias).
1 This is not to be confused with the “adaptivity” as in “adaptive composition”(Dwork et al., 2010) and “adaptive data
analysis”(Dwork et al., 2014a) commonly seen in the differential privacy literature. The latter is about how a sequence of actions
can be chosen as a function of the outcomes to all previous actions, while the notion of “adaptivity” that we considered is the
same as that in “adaptive estimation”, “adaptive algorithm design” (see, e.g., Bickel, 1982), which is about the extent to which
algorithms can exploits properties in the data sets without knowing that they exists a priori.
2A can be a DP algorithm but it does not have to be.
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3. Lastly, we analyze the procedure of releasing one sample from the posterior distribution (the OPS
estimator) for linear and ridge regression as an output perturbation procedure with a data-dependent
choice of the covariance matrix. We show using the pDP technique that, when conditioning on a data
set drawn from the linear regression model or having a well-conditioned design matrix, OPS achieves
(, δ)-pDP for while matching the Cramer-Rao lower bound up to a 1 + O˜(n−1−2) multiplicative factor.
OPS, unfortunately, cannot achieve DP with a constant  while remaining asymptotically efficient. We
fixed that by a new algorithm called AdaOPS, which provides (, δ)-DP and 1 + O˜(n−1−2)-statistical
efficiency at the same time.
To avoid any confusion, we also highlight a few things that this paper is not about. First of all, pDP is not a
replacement of DP. It is rather an analytical tool for us to understand the adaptivity in privacy loss and to
design more data-dependent DP algorithms. For instance, you can use pDP to describe the actually incurred
privacy loss to an individual when an -DP algorithm is applied to a given data set, rather than just covering
everything under a blanket statement that: “All I know is that it’s smaller than .” Secondly, for output
perturbation algorithms, we do not advocate calibrating the noise to per-instance sensitivity for setting pDP
to a prescribed budget, because the per-instance sensitivity itself is a data-dependent quantity. This is not
an intended use for pDP. In fact, if you insist on doing that, then you essentially changed the algorithm all
together and the corresponding per-instance sensitivity will change as well. Thirdly, pDP privacy loss is
something that the curator can calculate and keep as a confidential certificate, but not shared publicly or even
with data contributors, since pDP itself contains private information about the entire data set. Publishing
pDP differentially privately is an important problem and it is part of an ongoing future work.
1.1 Symbols and notations
Throughout the paper, we will use the standard notation in statistical learning. Data point z ∈ Z. In
supervised learning setting, z = (x, y) ∈ X × Y = Z. We use θ ∈ Θ to denote either the predictive function
X → Y or the parameter vector that specifies such a function. ` : Θ×Z → R to denote the loss function or
in a statistical model, ` represents the negative log-likelihood − log pθ(z). For example, in linear regression,
X ⊂ Rd, Y ⊂ R, Θ ⊂ Rd and `(θ, (x, y)) = (y − xT θ)2. Capital Z denotes a data set of an unspecified size,
i.e., Z ∈ Z∗ = ∪n=0,1,2,3,...Zn. We use A : Z∗ → PΘ to denote a randomized algorithm that takes in a data
set and outputs a draw from a distribution defined on a model space. In particular, A(Z) is used to denote
both a random variable and its distribution, so that we can say θ ∼ A(Z).  and (Z, z) will be reserved to
denote privacy loss, and Z,Z ′ ∈ Z∗ are reserved to denote the two adjacent data set. In particular, unless we
specify otherwise, Z ′ will be either adding z to Z or removing z from Z depending on whether Z contains z
or not. The notation Z z∼ Z ′ is used to explicitly say that Z and Z ′ differ by a single data point z.
1.2 Related work
This paper is related to the existing work in relaxing DP(Hall et al., 2013; Barber & Duchi, 2014; Wang
et al., 2016; Dwork & Rothblum, 2016; Bun & Steinke, 2016; Mironov, 2017), personalizing DP(Ghosh &
Roth, 2015; Ebadi et al., 2015; Liu et al., 2015), post hoc calculation of privacy guarantee (Abadi et al., 2016;
Rogers et al., 2016; Ligett et al., 2017; Balle & Wang, 2018), as well as in analytical frameworks for designing
data-adaptive DP algorithms (Nissim et al., 2007; Dwork & Lei, 2009). We provide more details below.
Relaxing and personalizing DP. Recall that the pure differential privacy loss can be defined as
 = sup
Z
z∼Z′
sup
θ∈Θ
log
pA(Z)(θ)
pA(Z′)(θ)
.
The effort in relaxing differential privacy mostly consider relaxing the supθ part of the definition, by either
using a different divergence measure (Barber & Duchi, 2014) or explicitly treating (θ) = log pA(Z)(θ)pA(Z′)(θ) as
a random variable induced by θ ∼ A(Z). The privacy random variable point of view connects (, δ)-DP
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to concentration inequalities and in particular, it produces the advanced composition of privacy losses via
Martingale concentration (Dwork et al., 2010). More recently, the idea is extended to define weaker notions of
privacy such as concentrated-DP (Dwork & Rothblum, 2016; Bun & Steinke, 2016) and Rényi-DP (Mironov,
2017). They allow for tighter accounting of the privacy losses through the moment generating function of the
privacy random variable.
Our work is complementary to this line of work, as we relax the sup
Z
z∼Z′ part of the definition and consider
the adaptivity of  to a fixed pair of data set Z and privacy target z. In some cases, we consider  to be a
random variable jointly parameterized by Z, z and θ.
The closest existing definition to ours is perhaps the personalized-DP, first seen in Ghosh & Roth (2015)
for the problem of selling privacy in auctions and reinvented by Ebadi et al. (2015); Liu et al. (2015) in
the context of private database queries and private recommendation systems respectively. They also try to
capture a personalized level of privacy for each individual z. The difference is that personalized-DP considers
adding or removing z from all data sets, while we consider adding z or removing z from a fixed Z.
Finally, pDP is related to random differential privacy (Hall et al., 2013) and on-average KL-privacy (Wang
et al., 2016). They respectively measure the high-probability and expected privacy loss when z and the data
points in Z are drawn i.i.d. from a distribution D, while we consider a fixed (Z, z) pair that is not necessarily
random.
We summarize these definitions in Table 1. It is clear from the table that if we ignore the differences in the
probability metric used, per-instance DP is arguably the most general, and adaptive, since it depends on
specific (Z, z) pairs.
Table 1: Comparing variants of differential privacy.
Data set private target probability metric parametrized by
Pure-DP supZ supz D∞(P‖Q) A only
Approx-DP supZ supz Dδ∞(P‖Q) A only
(z/m)-CDP supZ supz DsubG(P‖Q) A only
Rényi-DP supZ supz Dα(P‖Q) A only
Personal-DP supZ fixed z Dδ∞(P‖Q) A and z
TV-privacy supZ supz ‖P −Q‖TV A only
KL-privacy supZ supz DKL(P‖Q) A only
On-Avg KL-privacy EZ∼Dn Ez∼D DKL(P‖Q) A and D
Random-DP 1− δ 1− δ Dδ∞(P‖Q) A and D
Per-instance DP fixed Z fixed z Dδ∞(P‖Q) A, Z and z
Post hoc calculation of privacy loss. The idea of calculating the privacy loss after running a fixed
randomized algorithm is not new. It is the inverse problem of the typical task of calibrating noise to meet a
prescribed privacy requirement and is often used as an intermediate step in the analysis of the latter (Dwork
et al., 2006).
More recently, the post hoc view is adopted in the design of privacy odometer that tracks the post hoc overall
privacy loss of a list of sequentially-chosen privacy parameters (Rogers et al., 2016). Their analysis stays
at an abstract-level as it describes an algorithm solely by its (, δ)-DP guarantee. It is also used in a more
refined algorithm-specific privacy analysis for noisy SGD (Abadi et al., 2016) and Gaussian noise adding
(Balle & Wang, 2018), which simultaneously ensures ((δ), δ)-DP for all 0 < δ < 1 with a monotonically
decreasing function (δ). However, they do not adapt to the given input data set.
Ligett et al. (2017) defines“ex-post privacy loss” (Definition 2.2.) to be the realized privacy loss random
variable (Outcome), but also do not adapt to the given input data set. In fact, a direct comparison of their
analysis of linear/ridge regression (Theorem 3.1) to our case study reveals that our pDP analysis with the
subsequent pDP-to-DP conversion allows us to come up with an algorithm that exploits the strong convexity
that comes from the data set, and hence a more favorable bias-variance trade-off.
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Data-dependent post hoc privacy analysis relatively recent and was discussed in (Papernot et al., 2016) in the
same flavor of “pDP for all”, except that it is done with Renyi DP. They did not consider more fine-grained
pDP which can be different for every individual.
Frameworks for data-dependent DP algorithms. Data-dependent DP algorithms were investigated
under the classical framework of smooth sensitivity (Nissim et al., 2007) and propose-test-release (PTR)
(Dwork & Lei, 2009). The focus of these popular frameworks is on how to calibrate noise to local sensitivity,
rather than how to calculate the data-dependent privacy loss after running a fixed randomized algorithm.
Note that the algorithm under consideration needs not be differentially private and we do not propose to
calibrate an algorithm based on pDP. The purpose of pDP analysis is to provide a more precise privacy loss
summary of a given randomized algorithm, even though it might not be DP in the worse case.
Building upon the pDP analysis, we demonstrated that sometimes one can use it to design data-dependent
DP algorithm. The approach is closely related to the PTR framework but has a more systematic way of
identifying the key quantities that contribute to the sensitivity. Also, instead of proposing and testing an
(often exponentially long) sequence of criteria, our approach involves directly releasing differentially private
high-confidence bounds of certain key quantities. In particular, the proposed data-dependent differentially
private linear regression estimator by (Dwork & Lei, 2009) runs in time exponential in the dimension, while
our proposed AdaOPSis polynomial in all parameters.
While the manuscript is under peer-review, an anonymous reviewer brought to our attention the independent
work of Cummings & Durfee (2018). They consider an alternative framework for data-dependent DP algorithm
design in which they use a notion called “individual sensitivity”, which measures the maximum perturbation of
a function when we add an individual z to any data set Z that does not contain z. This is different from either
local sensitivity or per-instance sensitivity (that we will discuss in the next section) but is almost identical
to the “personalized sensitivity” used in (Ghosh & Roth, 2015; Liu et al., 2015; Ebadi et al., 2015). For
many problems, e.g., linear regression, personalized sensitivity can be unbounded for all z, while per-instance
sensitivity remains finite provided that the design matrix is not singular. In addition, their approach runs in
exponential time in general and seems to apply only to output perturbation algorithms. pDP, on the other
hand, is well-defined for any randomized algorithm.
2 Per-instance differential privacy
In this section, we define per-instance differential privacy, and derive its properties. We begin by parsing the
standard definition of differential privacy.
Definition 1 (Differential privacy (Dwork et al., 2006)). We say a randomized algorithm A satisfies (, δ)-DP
if, for all data set Z and data set Z ′ that can be constructed by adding or removing one data point z from Z,
Pθ∼A(Z)(θ ∈ S) ≤ ePθ∼A(Z′)(θ ∈ S) + δ, ∀ measurable set S.
When δ = 0, this is also known as pure differential privacy.
It is helpful to understand what differential privacy is protecting against — a powerful adversary that knows
everything in the entire universe, except one bit of information: whether a target z is in the data set or not
in the data set. The optimal strategy for such an adversary is to conduct a likelihood ratio test (or posterior
inference) on this bit, and differential privacy uses randomization to limit the probability of success of such
test (Wasserman & Zhou, 2010).
Note that the adversary always knows Z and has a clearly defined target z, and it is natural to evaluate the
winnings and losses of the “player”, the data curator by conditioning on the same data set and privacy target.
This gives rise to the following generalization of DP.
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Definition 2 (Per-instance Differential Privacy). For a fixed data set Z and a fixed data point z. We say a
randomized algorithm A satisfy (, δ)-per-instance-DP for (Z, z) if, for all measurable set S ⊂ Θ, it holds that
Pθ∼A(Z)(θ ∈ S) ≤ ePθ∼A([Z,z])(θ ∈ S) + δ,
Pθ∼A([Z,z])(θ ∈ S) ≤ ePθ∼A(Z)(θ ∈ S) + δ.
This definition is different from DP primarily because DP is the property of the A only and pDP is the
property of both A, Z and z. If we take supremum over all Z ∈ Zn and z ∈ Z, then it recovers the standard
differential privacy.
Similarly, we can define per-instance sensitivity for (Z, z).
Definition 3 (per-instance sensitivity). Let H = Rd, for a fixed Z and z. The per-instance ‖·‖∗ sensitivity of
a function f : Data→ Rd is defined as ‖f(Z)−f([Z, z])‖∗, where ‖·‖∗ could be `p norm or ‖·‖A =
√
(·)TA(·)
defined by a positive definite matrix A.
This definition also generalizes quantities in the classic DP literature. If we fix Z but maximize over all z ∈ Z,
we get local-sensitivity (Nissim et al., 2007). If we maximize over both Z ∈ Z∗ and z ∈ Z, we get global
sensitivity (Dwork et al., 2014b, Definition 3.1). These two are often infinite in real-life problems, but for a
fixed data set Z and target z to be protected, we could still get meaningful per-instance sensitivity.
Immediately, the per-instance sensitivity implies pDP for a noise adding procedure.
Lemma 4 (Multivariate Gaussian mechanism). Let θˆ be a deterministic map from a data set to a point
in Θ, e.g., a deterministic learning algorithm, and let the A-norm per-instance sensitivity ∆A(Z, z) be
‖θˆ([Z, z])− θˆ(Z)‖A. Then adding noise with covariance matrix A−1/γ obeys ((Z, z), δ)-pDP for any δ > 0
with
(Z, z) = γ∆A(Z, z)
√
log(1.25/δ).
The proof, which is standard and we omit, simply verifies the definition of (, δ)-pDP by calculating a tail
bound of the privacy loss random variable and invokes Lemma 24.
2.1 Basic properties of pDP
We now describe properties of per-instance DP, which mostly mirror those of DP.
Fact 5 (Strong protection against identification). Let A obeys (, δ)-pDP for (Z, z), then for any measurable
set S ⊂ Θ where min{Pθ∼A(Z)(θ ∈ S),Pθ∼A(Z)(θ ∈ S)} ≥ δ/ then given any side information aux
−2 ≤ log Pθ∼A(Z)(θ ∈ S|aux)
Pθ∼A([Z,z])(θ ∈ S|aux) ≤ 2.
Proof. Note that after fixing Z, θ is a fresh sample from A(Z), as a result, θ ⊥ aux|Z. The claimed fact then
directly follows from the definition.
Note that the log-odds ratio measures how likely one is able to tell one distribution from another based on
side information and an event S of the released result θ. When the log-odds ratio is close to 0, the outcome θ
is equally likely to be drawn from either distribution.
Fact 6 (Convenient properties directly inherited from DP). For each (Z, z) separately we have:
1. Simple composition: Let A and B be two randomized algorithms, satisfying (1, δ1)-pDP, (2, δ2)-pDP,
then (A,B) jointly is (1 + 2, δ1 + δ2)-pDP.
2. Advanced composition: Let A1, ...,Ak be a sequence of randomized algorithms, where Ai could depend on
the realization of A1(Z), ...,Ai(Z), each with (, δ)-pDP, then jointly A1:k obeys O(
√
k log(1/δ)), O(kδ)-
pDP. The same claim also holds for algorithm-specific advanced composition via concentrated DP and
Renyi DP.
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3. Closedness to post-processing: If A satisfies (1, δ1)-pDP, for any function f , f(A(·)) also obeys
(1, δ1)-pDP.
4. Group privacy: If A obeys (, δ)-pDP with , δ parameterized by (Data,Target), then
Pθ∼A(Z)(θ ∈ S) ≤ e(Z,z1)+([Z,z1],z2)+...+([Z,z1:k−1],zk)Pθ∼A([Z,z1:k])(θ ∈ S) + δ˜.
Pθ∼A([Z,z1:k])(θ ∈ S) ≤ e(Z,z1)+([Z,z1],z2)+...+([Z,z1:k−1],zk)Pθ∼A(Z)(θ ∈ S) + δ˜.
for δ˜ =
∑
i=1:k
[
δ([Z, z1:i−1], zi)
∏
j=1:i−1 e
([Z,z1:j−1],zj)
]
.
Proof. These properties all directly follow from the proof of these properties for differential privacy (see e.g.,
(Dwork et al., 2014b)), as the uniformity over data sets is never used in the proof. The group privacy is more
involved since the size of the data set changes as the size of the privacy target (now a fixed group of people)
gets larger, group privacy statement follows from a simple calculation that repeatedly applies the definition
of pDP for a different data set.
2.2 The distribution and moments of pDP
One useful notion to consider in practice is to understand exactly how much privacy loss is incurred for those
who participated in the data set. This is practically relevant, because if a cautious individual decides to not
submit his/her data, he/she would necessarily do it by rejecting a data-usage agreement and therefore the
data collector is not legally obligated to protect this person and in fact does not have access to his/her data
in the first place.
It is debatable whether it is as important to protect individuals who are not in the data set as those who are.
We will illustrate this point with an example. Suppose the Federal government is to decide on a potential
funding support based on whether a township’s average household income qualifies for it. Household income
is clearly considered sensitive information, so the census bureau decides to add a Laplace noise to the average
income to prevent privacy risk. The noise level is chosen independently of the data such that it will not
make the funding decision impossible. If we consider the richest person on earth, it is possible that his/her
household income is larger than the total GDP of this township. The noise-adding algorithm does not provide
a meaningful DP guarantee to him/her, as it will be straightforward to infer with high confidence that this
person does not live in this township. But does it matter? It is unlikely that the richest person on earth
would consider this kind of inference about him/her a breach of privacy.
pDP provides analytical tools to formally study the privacy of only those people in a data set. It offers a
natural way to analyze and also empirically estimate any statistics of the pDP losses over a distribution of
data points corresponding to a fixed randomized algorithm A.
Definition 7 (Moment pDP for a distribution). Let (Z, z) be drawn from some distribution (not necessarily
a product distribution) P, it induces a distribution of (Z, z). Then we say that the distribution obeys kth
moment per-instance DP with parameter vector (E,E[2], ...,E[k], δ).
The moments of pDP and the corresponding view of pDP’s privacy loss as a random variable is a powerful
idea and it enables flexible and comprehensive descriptions of the privacy footprint of a randomized algorithm
on a set of targets subject to a constraint or a distribution of the input data set. We give a few examples
below.
pDP of a data set. Let Z be a fixed data set, when we choose P to be a discrete uniform distribution
supported on {(Z−i, zi)}ni=1 with probability 1/n for each i. Then taking k = 2 allows us to calculate
the mean and variance of the privacy loss of individuals in a data set, and taking higher order k allows
us to produce quantile estimates and high probability tail bounds of the random-variable of an average
user in the data set.
pDP for all. When we fix Z and but allow z to be drawn any distribution defined on Z, then this becomes
a much stronger notion of privacy that protects all individual z ∈ Z provided that the data set is Z.
This is closely related to local sensitivity (Nissim et al., 2007; Dwork & Lei, 2009).
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Figure 1: Illustration of the privacy loss  of an output perturbation algorithm under DP, pDP for all, as
well as the distribution of pDP’s privacy loss for data points in the data set. The data set is generated by a
linear Gaussian model, where the design matrix is normalized such that each row has Euclidean norm 1 and
y is also clipped at [−1, 1]. The output perturbation algorithm releases θˆ ∼ N ((XTX + I)−1Xy, σ2I) with
σ = 4. Our choice of δ = 10−6.
pDP for one. When we fix z but allow Z to be drawn from any distributions defined on a collection of data
sets, then this becomes the worst case privacy loss that can happen to a given individual z. This notion
is closely related to the personalized DP (Ghosh & Roth, 2015; Ebadi et al., 2015; Liu et al., 2015) and
could be useful when individuals have different sensitivity.
pDP with assumptions on data sets. As we mentioned in the introduction, a branch of modern machine
learning focuses on finding reasonable assumptions on the data sets which reduces the computation and
sample complexity of a problem. In this case, Z could be drawn from any distributions such that these
assumptions are true with probability 1, in other words, we can take advantage of these assumptions
when calculating the privacy loss of an individual z.
pDP with a data set prior. When we take Z ∼ pi for some prior distribution pi, then the moments of pDP
makes it possible to take advantage of that prior distribution to describe the privacy of an individual z
as a distribution over the possible privacy loss.
As an illustration, we compare pDP of a data set, pDP for all and the classical differential privacy using a
simulated experiment. The results are shown in Figure 1. As we can see, the more fine-grained per-instance
DP reveals more than an order of magnitude stronger privacy protection for all users in the data set, and six
times better privacy protection for all users in the entire universe, than the standard DP’s characterization.
We will revisit some of these notions in our case study for linear regressions in Section 4 with concrete
bounds.
2.3 Generalization and domain adaptation
Assume that the data set is drawn iid from some unknown distribution D — a central assumption in statistical
learning theory — then we can take P = Dn−1 × D. This allows us to use the moment of pDP losses to
capture on average how well data points drawn from D are protected. It also controls generalization error,
and more generally cross-domain generalization.
Definition 8 (On-average generalization). Under the standard notations of statistical learning, the on-average
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generalization error of an algorithm A is defined as
Gen(A,D, n) =
∣∣∣∣∣EZ∼Dn,z∼DEθ∼A(Z) 1n
n∑
i=1
`(θ, zi)− `(θ, z)
∣∣∣∣∣
Proposition 9 (Moment pDP implies generalization). Assume bounded loss function 0 ≤ `(θ, z) ≤ 1. Then
the on-average generalization is smaller than
EZ∼Dn(Ez∼D[e(Z,z)|Z])2 − 1 + EZ∼Dn,z∼Dδ(Z, z) + (EZ∼DnEz∼D[e(Z,z)|Z]Ez∼D[δ(Z, z)|Z].
Note that this can also be used to capture the privacy and generalization of transfer learning (also known
as domain adaptation) with a fixed data set or a fixed distribution. Let the training distribution be D and
target distribution be D′,
Take P = Dn⊗D′ or P = δZ ⊗D′. In practice, this allows us to upper bound the generalization to the Asian
demographics group, when the training data is drawn from a distribution that is dominated by white males
(e.g., the current DNA sequencing data set). We formalize this idea as follows.
Definition 10 (Cross-domain generalization). Assume 0 ≤ `(θ, z) ≤ 1. The on-average cross-domain
generalization with base distribution D to target distribution D′ is defined as:
Gen(A,D,D′, n) ≤
∣∣∣∣∣EZ∼Dn,z∼D′Eθ∼A(Z)
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
ρi`(θ, zi)− `(θ, z)
]∣∣∣∣∣ .
where ρi = D′(zi)/D(zi) is the inverse propensity (or importance weight) to account for the differences in the
two domains.
Proposition 11. The cross-domain on-average generalization can be bounded as follows:
Gen(A,D,D′, n) = EZ∼Dn−1,{z′}∼D,z′′∼D′ [(e(Z,z
′)+(Z,z′′) − 1) + δ(Z, z′) + (Z, z′)δ(Z, z′′)]
The expressions in Proposition 9 and 11 are a little complex, we will simplify them to make it more
readable.
Corollary 12. Let supZ,z δ(Z, z) ≤ δ, and ED[e2(Z,z)] ≤ 1 and for simplicity, we write EZ∼Dn,z∼D(Z, z) =
EDf and EZ∼Dn,z∼D′(Z, z) = ED′f . Then the cross-domain on-average generalization is smaller than
1
2
[EDe2 + ED′e2]− 1 + 2δ = 1
2
[ ∞∑
i=1
2i
i!
EDi + ED′i
]
+ 2δ.
It will be interesting to compare the quantity to Rényi-DP which also uses the moment generating function of
the privacy random variable. The difference is that in Rényi-DP, the privacy random variable is induced by
the distribution of the output, while here it is induced by the distribution of the data set and the target.
3 Per-instance sensitivity in smooth learning problems
In this section, we present our main results and give concrete examples in which per-instance sensitivity
(hence per-instance privacy) can be analytically calculated. Specifically, we consider following regularized
empirical risk minimization form:
θˆ = argmin
θ
∑
i
`(θ, zi) + r(θ), (1)
or in the non-convex case, finding a local minimum. `(θ, z) and r(θ) are the loss functions and regularization
terms. We make the following assumptions:
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A.1. ` and r are differentiable in argument θ.
A.2. The partial derivatives are absolute continuous, i.e., they are twice differentiable almost everywhere
and the second order partial derivatives are Lebesgue integrable.
Our results under these assumptions will cover learning problems such as linear and kernel machines as well
as some neural network formulations (e.g., multilayer perceptron and convolutional net with sigmoid/tanh
activation), but not non-smooth problems like lasso, `1-SVM or neural networks ReLU activation. We also
note that these conditions are implied by standard assumptions of strong smoothness (gradient Lipschitz)
and do not require the function to be twice differentiable everywhere. For instance, the results will cover the
case when either ` or r is a Huber function, which is not twice differentiable.
Technically, these assumptions allow us to take Taylor expansion and have an integral form of the remainder,
which allows us to prove the following stability bound.
Lemma 13. Assume ` and r satisfy Assumption A.1 and A.2. Let θˆ be a stationary point of
∑
i `(θ, zi)+r(θ),
θˆ′ be a stationary point
∑
i `(θ, zi)+`(θ, z)+r(θ) and in addition, let ηt = tθˆ+(1−t)θˆ′ denotes the interpolation
of θˆ and θˆ′. Then the following identity holds:
θˆ − θˆ′ =
[∫ 1
0
(∑
i
∇2`(ηt, zi) +∇2`(ηt, z) +∇2r(ηt)
)
dt
]−1
∇`(θˆ, z)
= −
[∫ 1
0
(∑
i
∇2`(ηt, zi) +∇2r(ηt)
)
dt
]−1
∇`(θˆ′, z).
The proof uses first order stationarity condition of the optimal solution and apply Taylor’s theorem on the
gradient.
The lemma is very interpretable. It says that the perturbation of adding or removing a data point can be
viewed as a one-step quasi-newton update to the parameter. Also note that ∇`(θˆ′, z) is the “score function”
in parametric statistical models, and when `(θˆ′, (x, y)) = `(fθˆ(x), y), it is the product of the “pseudo-residual”
∂`
∂f and the gradient direction ∇f in gradient boosting (see e.g., Friedman et al., 2001, Chapter 10).
The result implies that the per-instance sensitivity in ‖ · ‖A for some p.d. matrix A can be stated in terms of
a certain norm of the “score function” specified by a quadratic form H−1AH−1, and therefore by Lemma 4,
the output perturbation algorithm:
θ˜ ∼ N (θˆ(X), A−1/γ), (2)
obeys (, δ)-pDP for any δ > 0 and
(Z, z) =
√
∇`(θˆ′, z)TH−1AH−1∇`(θˆ′, z) log(1.25/δ). (3)
This is interesting because for most loss functions the “score function” is often proportional to the prediction
error of the fitted model θˆ′ on data point z and this result suggests that the more accurately a model predicts
a data point, the more private this data point is. This connection is made more explicit when we specialize
to linear regression and the per-instance sensitivity
∆A(Z, z) = |y − xT θˆ|
√
xT ([X ′]TX ′)−1A([X ′]TX ′)−1x = |y − xT θˆ′|
√
xT (XTX)−1A(XTX)−1x. (4)
is clearly proportional to prediction error. In addition, when we choose A ≈ XTX, the second term becomes
either µ := xT ([X,x]T [X,x])−1x or µ′ := xT (XTX)−1x, which are “in-sample” and “out-of-sample” statistical
leverage scores of x.
Leverage score measures the importance/uniqueness of a data point relative to the rest of the data set and it
is used extensively in regression analysis (Chatterjee & Hadi, 1986) (for outlier detection and experiment
design), graph sparsification (for adaptive sampling) (Spielman & Srivastava, 2011) and numerical linear
algebra (for fast matrix computation)(Drineas et al., 2012). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
time leverage scores are shown to be connected to differential privacy.
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4 Case study: pDP analysis in linear regression
So far we have described output perturbation algorithms with a fixed noise adding procedure. However
in practice it is not known ahead of time how to choose A. Assume all x are normalized to ‖x‖ = 13,
denote µ2(x) := xT (XTX)−2x, µ1(x) := xT (XTX)−1x. We discuss the pros and cons of the three natural
choices.
• A ≈ λminI: This corresponds to the standard `2-sensitivity and it adds an isotropic noise and provides
a uniform guarantee for all data-target pairs where XTX has smallest eigenvalue λmin, because
supx
√
µ2(x) ≤ 1/λmin, but it adds more noise than necessary for those with much smaller µ2(x).
• A ≈ (XTX)2: We call this the “democratic” choice conditioned on the data set, as it homogenizes the
“leverage” part of the per-instance sensitivity of points to ‖x‖ = 1 so any x gets about the same level of
privacy. It, however, is not robust to if our data-independent choice of A is in fact far away from the
actual (XTX)2.
• A ≈ XTX: We call this the “Fisher”-choice, because the covariance matrix will be proportional to
the inverse Fisher information, which is the natural estimation error of θˆ under the linear regression
assumption. The advantage of this choice is that conducting statistical inference, e.g., t-test and
ANOVA for linear regression coefficients would be trivial.
Interestingly, for linear and ridge regression, the second and third choices are closely related to popular
algorithms studied before. In fact, taking A = (XTX)2 recovers the objective perturbation (ObjPert)
method(Chaudhuri et al., 2011; Kifer et al., 2012):
θˆ = argmin
θ∈Θ
‖y −Xθ‖2 + 〈z, θ〉, θ ∼ N (0, σ2I). (5)
while taking A = XTX recovers the one-posterior-sampling (OPS) mechanism proposed in (Dimitrakakis
et al., 2014; Wang et al., 2015), which outputs
θˆ ∼ P (θ|X,y) ∝ e−γ‖y−Xθ‖2 . (6)
An important difference is that in ObjPert and OPS, A is not fixed, but rather depends on the data. As a
result, we cannot use Lemma 4 to calculate the pDP. In fact, if the data-target can be arbitrary and r = 0,
the data-independent choice of A could imply an unbounded  (consider an arbitrarily near singular X and x
in its null space).
Not surprisingly, existing analyses of ObjPert and OPS require additional assumptions. Kifer et al. (2012)
adds an additional λ‖θ‖2 to (5), while Wang et al. (2015) assumes that the loss function is bounded (by
modifying it or constraining the domain Θ) so that the exponential mechanism (McSherry & Talwar, 2007)
would apply. It was later pointed out in (Foulds et al., 2016) that OPS is not asymptotically efficient in that
it has an asymptotic relative efficiency (ARE) inversely proportional to , while simple sufficient statistics
perturbation can achieve asymptotic efficiency comparable to (Smith, 2008).
In the remainder of the section, we will first zoom into the OPS and propose a direct analysis of pDP using
Lemma 13, then we will describe how to use the pDP analysis to obtain an extension of OPS that obeys
(, δ)-DP and asymptotically efficient under the same data assumption in (Foulds et al., 2016). We will see
that OPS effectively converges to the “Fisher”-choice of noise adding in the same asymptotic regime and
offers dimension and condition number independent expected pDP loss.
4.1 pDP analysis of OPS
The first result calculates the pDP loss of OPS.
3 This assumption simplifies the presentation. In general, we can conduct pDP analysis to any randomized algorithm on any
data set. However, as Cummings et al. (2015) has shown, if the data domain is not bounded, then no algorithm can differentially
privately release linear regression coefficients with non-trivial accuracy in general.
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Theorem 14 (The adaptivity of OPS in Linear/Ridge Regression). Consider the OPS algorithm that
samples from
p(θ|X,y) ∝ e− γ2 (‖y−Xθ‖2+λ‖θ‖2).
Let θˆ and θˆ′ be the ridge regression estimate with data set X×y and [X,x]×[y, y] and defined the out of sample
leverage score µ := xT (XTX+λI)−1x = xTH−1x and in-sample leverage score µ′ := xT [(X ′)TX ′+λI]−1x =
xT (H ′)−1x. Then for every δ > 0, privacy target (x, y), the algorithm is (, δ)-pDP with
(Z, z) ≤1
2
∣∣∣∣− log(1 + µ) + γµ(1 + µ) (y − xT θˆ)2
∣∣∣∣+ µ2 log(2/δ) +√γµ log(2/δ)|y − xT θˆ| (7)
=
1
2
∣∣∣∣− log(1− µ′)− γµ′1− µ′ (y − xT θˆ′)2
∣∣∣∣+ µ′2 log(2/δ) +√γµ′ log(2/δ)|y − xT θˆ′|. (8)
The proof is given in the appendix.
The two equivalent upper bounds are both useful. (7) is ideal for calculating pDP when x is not in the data
set and (8) is perfect for the case when x is in the data set.
Remark 15. The bound (7) can be simplified to
µ
2
(1 + log(2/δ)) +
1
2
γmin(µ, 1)|y − xT θˆ′|2 +
√
γµ log(2/δ)|y − xT θˆ′|.
If µ = o(log(2/δ))4 and we choose γ such that
√
γµ′ log(2/δ)|y − xT θˆ′| ≤ 1, then the bound can be simplified
to
(Z, z) ≤ 2
√
γµ log(2/δ)|y − xT θˆ|+ o(1).
This matches the order of Gaussian mechanism with a fixed (data-independent) covariance matrix.
The results in (Foulds et al., 2016) are stated for general exponential family models under a set of assumptions
that translate into the following for linear regression:
(a) data x1, ..., xn is drawn i.i.d. from D supported on X where X ⊂ B‖·‖2(1).
(b) population covariance matrix md I  EDxxT  Md I for constant m and M ,
(c) yi ∼ N (xTi θ0, σ2) for some θ0.
To simplify the presentation, we also assume n scales with respect to d such that
(d) with high probability, XXT  αn2d I.
The last assumption measures how quickly the empirical covariance matrix 1nXX
T concentrates to Ex∼DxxT .
It can be shown that if X is an appropriately scaled subgaussian random matrix, this happens with probability
1− n−10 whenever n > max(10d, 10d−2/3 log n).
Proposition 16. The sequence of OPS algorithm with parameter γn, λn obeys the following properties.
1. pDP and DP in the agnostic setting. Assume ‖x‖ ≤ 1 for every x ∈ X . The algorithm obeys
(n, δ)-pDP, for each data set (X,y) and all target (x, y),
n =
√
γn log(2/δ)
λn + λmin
|y − xT θˆ|+ γn|y − x
T θˆ|2
2 max{λn + λmin, 1} +
γn(1 + log(2/δ))
2(λn + λmin)
. (9)
If we further assume |y| < 1, then sup(X,y),(x,y) |y − xT θˆ| = 1 + n1/2λ−1/2n and the algorithm obeys
(n, δ)-DP with
n =
√
2(n+ λn)γn log(2/δ)
λ2n
+
2(n+ λn)γn
λn max{1, λn} +
γn(1 + log(2/δ))
2λn
. (10)
4 This is not an unrealistic assumption because µ and µ′ are o(1) as long as x is bounded and the minimum eigenvalue of
XTX + λI is ω(1). This is required for (agnostic) linear regression to be consistent and is implied by the condition that the
population covariance matrix 1
n
EXTX is full rank.
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2. pDP under model assumption. Assume conditions (a)(b)(c)(d) above are true, and also γn = ω(1),
λn = o(
√
n). Then with high probability over the joint distribution of (X,y), the algorithm with
γn ≤ 4n log(2/δ)max{d,(1+log(2/δ))2} obeys (n, δ)-pDP with
n =

O
(√
(1+‖θ0‖)2dγn
αn log(
2
δ )
)
for all (x,y) satisfying ‖x‖ = O(1) and y = O(1).
O
(√
σ2dγn
αn log(
2
δ ) log(
2
δ′ )
)
for any x ∈ X with probability 1− δ′ over y ∼ N (θT0 x, σ2).
Moreover, with probability 1−nδ′ over the conditional distribution y|X, the privacy loss of (x1, y1), ..., (xn, yn)
obeys
1
n
n∑
i=1
n
(
(X,y), (xi, yi)
)2
= O
(σ2dγn
n
log(2/δ) log(2/δ′)
)
,
which does not depend on α — the smallest eigenvalue of dXTX/n.
3. Statistical efficiency. for every realization of data set X such that n > d and let the smallest
eigenvalue of XTX be λmin, then
Ey∼N (Xθ0,σ2In)
[
‖θ˜ − θ0‖2
∣∣∣X] = σ2tr[(XTX + λnI)−1](1 + γ−1n ) + λ2n‖(XTX + λnI)−1θ0‖2
If λmin = Ω(d/n) ( this is true with high probability under assumption (b)(d)) Then we get
Ey∼N (Xθ0,σ2In)
[
‖θ˜ − θ0‖2
∣∣∣X] = σ2tr[(XTX + λnI)−1](1 + γ−1n ) +O(λ2nd2‖θ0‖2n2 )
In other word, the estimator is asymptotically efficient, for all λn = o(n1/2) and γn = ω(1).
4. Optimization error. Let F (θ) = 0.5‖y −Xθ‖2 + λ‖θ‖2 and θˆ = argminF (θ), then
EF (θ˜)− F (θˆ) = d/γn,
and also with probability at least 1− δ over P (θ˜|Z)
F (θ˜)− F (θˆ) ≤ d log(d/δ)/γn.
With γn = 
2αn
d log(2/δ) , the result matches the information-theoretic lower bound for differentially private
empirical risk minimization (Bassily et al., 2014)5.
We now discuss a few aspects of the above results.
pDP vs DP in the agnostic setting. Firstly, it highlights the key advantage of pDP over DP. DP is not
able to take advantage of desirable structures in the data set, while pDP provides a principled framework to
handle them.
In particular, let us compare the pDP and DP in the agnostic setting, for the OPS that uses the same
randomization. DP measures something that is completely data independent and corresponds specifically to
a contrivedly constructed data set (X,y) such that y is an eigenvector of XXT corresponding to a specific
eigenvalue of magnitude
√
λn, this makes ‖θˆ‖2 as large as
√
n/
√
λn. Moreover, a target data point is chosen
so that x match the direction of θˆ. While this is a legitimate construction in theory, but it does not directly
correspond to the specific data set that a statistician just spent two years collecting, and it is unreasonable
that he/she will have to calibrate the amount of noise to inject to provide more reasonable protection to a
pathological case that has nothing to do with the reality.
5Note that in (Bassily et al., 2014), the strong convexity parameter ∆ is assumed for each loss function, therefore it maps
into our α as ∆  α/d. Also, we used that in (Bassily et al., 2014)’s setting the loss function is Lipschitz within the bounded
domain, which ensures |y − xT θ| = O(1).
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pDP, on the other hand, makes it possible for the statistician to condition on the data set. If the statistician
finds out that ‖θˆ‖2 = O(1), then the pDP loss is as small as
√
γn log(2/δ)/λn for everyone in the population.
With γn = nα/2 and λn = n1/2−α/2 for any α > 0, the algorithm remains to be statistically efficient with
an ARE of (1 + n−α) yet can provide a strong privacy guarantee of n = n−1/4+α/2. If in addition, the
statistician realized that the data set is well-conditioned, that is, the maximum and minimum eigenvalue of
XTX are on the same order of n/d, then we can further improve the bound by replacing λn with λmin + λn.
The statistician can happily get away with the same privacy guarantee (n = n−1/4) while not having to add
too much noise or even regularize at all (setting γn = n1/2 and λn = 0). Note that the condition number is a
desirable property that governs how reliably one can hope to estimate the linear regression coefficients using
the given data set.
We would like to emphasize that the pDP guarantee in the two cases we discussed above applies to everyone
in the population {(x, y)|‖x‖ ≤ 1, |y| ≤ 1}, therefore such (, δ)-pDP guarantee is as powerful as (, δ)-DP
after the data set is collected.
pDP-for-all vs average pDP on the data set. Secondly, unlike DP which always provides a crude upper
bound for everyone, pDP is able to reflect the differences in the protection of different target person. Under
the model assumption, the average privacy loss of people in the data set, is scale-invariant and interestingly,
also independent of the condition number (smallest eigenvalue). It is a factor of (1 + |θ0|)2/m times smaller
than the pDP guarantee for everyone in the population. This is significant for finite sample performance
since (1 + ‖θ0‖)/m (although they do not change with n), can be quite large.
pDP under covariate shift. Lastly, if we consider a setting in between the above two, where the target
x can be drawn from any distribution defined on X that could be arbitrarily different from the training
data distribution, then the scale-invariant property remains (the factor of (1 + ‖θ0‖) is dropped). This is
relevant in causal learning when the E(y|x) is specified by some physical principles that are invariant to the
distribution of x. In this case, the moments of the pDP would imply a much stronger notion of cross-domain
generalization than what we show in Proposition 11 since it does not depend on the target distribution of
interest.
Improved DP guarantee for OPS. The proposition also improves the existing analysis for the OPS
algorithm as a byproduct. The first statement shows that OPS preserves a meaningful (almost constant)
differential privacy when γn = 1 and λn =
√
n/d without requiring a constant boundedness in the domain Θ
or clipping the loss function like in Wang et al. (2015). As a matter of fact, the ridge regression solution
θˆ could be in a ball of radius Θ(n1/4), and even if we impose the smallest domain bound that covers θˆ, by
exponential mechanism, the algorithm only obeys a pure O(n1/2)-DP, in contrast to the (O(log(1/δ)), δ)-DP
that we showed in the proposition above.
Despite the improvement, the DP guarantee is still a little unsatisfactory. If we require (, δ)-DP with constant
, then the OPS algorithm with λn =
√
n is not asymptotically efficient (although it does achieve the optimal
O(1/n) rate).
Meanwhile, there are algorithms that attain asymptotic efficiency either by subsample-and-aggregate (Smith,
2008) or by simply adding noise to the sufficient statistics (Dwork & Smith, 2010; Foulds et al., 2016). So the
question becomes: can we modify OPS such that it becomes asymptotically efficient with (n, δ)-differentially
private with n = o(1)?
We address this issue next.
4.2 “pDP to DP conversion” and AdaOPS
In this section, we resolve the dilemma described earlier by using the idea of Dwork & Lei (2009). The new
algorithm, which we call AdaOPS, adaptively and differentially privately chooses the tuning parameter λn
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and γn according to properties of the data set and privacy requirement. A pseudocode of AdaOPS is given
in Algorithm 1. We acknowledge that the same idea of adaptively adding regularization term is not new
and had been used by Kifer et al. (2012); Blocki et al. (2012); Sheffet (2017) for analyzing other related
differentially private algorithms. Our contribution here is only to assemble the ideas together into a working
algorithm and illustrate how pDP analysis can help us design data-dependent DP algorithm that takes a
prescribed (, δ) budget as an input.
Algorithm 1 AdaOPS: One-Posterior Sample estimator with adaptive regularization
input Data X, y. Privacy target: , δ. And parameter κ satisfying 0 ≤ κ ≤ n4d(1+log(4/δ))
1. Calculate the minimum eigenvalue λmin(XTX).
2. Private release λ˜min = λmin +
√
log(4/δ)
/2 Z, where Z ∼ N (0, 1).
3. Get one sample
θ˜ ∼ P(θ|X,y) ∝ e− γn2 (‖y−Xθ‖2+λn‖θ‖2)
with parameter
λn = min
{
0,
n
dκ
− λ˜min + log(4/δ)
/2
}
γn = min
{
n2
16κ2d2 log(4/δ)
,
n
8κ2d2
}
output θ˜
The κ parameter is the largest acceptable condition number in the data set. Often it can be determined
independently of the data. It is used in the algorithm to rule out the pathological case of a possibly
near-singular design matrix. We now analyze the properties of AdaOPS.
Proposition 17. 1. Assume data domain is ‖x‖2 ≤ 1 and |y| ≤ 1. The AdaOPS estimator preserves
(, δ)-DP.
2. If Assumption (a)(b)(c) are true and in addition for the specific realization of X,
λmin(X
TX) >
n
κd
+
√
log(10n) log(4/δ)
/2
,
then, we have
E[‖θ˜ − θ0‖2|X] = [1 + γn]σ2tr[(XTX)−1] +O(n−10)‖θ0‖2.
In other words, since γn ≤ min{κ
2d2 log(4/δ)
n2 ,
κ2d2
n }, the AdaOPS estimator achieves asymptotic effi-
ciency whenever  obeys that min{n2, s} = o(κ2d2 log(4/δ)/n).
This proposition reveals that AdaOPS improves over previous results in the literature (Smith, 2008; Foulds
et al., 2016) in several ways. First of all, we only need n2 = o(1) to achieve asymptotic efficiency. In
contrast, (Foulds et al., 2016) does not provide non-asymptotic results with explicit dependence and (Smith,
2008)’s bound for the subsample-and-aggregate method requires n−1/5−6/5 = o(1) to achieve asymptotic
efficiency.
Secondly, our bound has explicit dimension dependence while (Foulds et al., 2016) and (Smith, 2008) treat d
as a constant. In particular, our bound on the additive difference from exactly matching the Cramer-Rao
lower bound of (σ2tr((XTX)−1)) translates into σ2tr[(XTX)−1] + d3/(n22).
The extension from OPS to AdaOPS is a good example of what we call “pDP to DP conversion”, which
follows the following procedures:
1. Start with a fixed randomized algorithm of interest A. (e.g.,OPS)
2. Calculate its pDP analytically (Proposition 14).
3. Inspect to identify key quantities ( in our case it is the strong convexity parameters).
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Figure 2: Left: (, δ)-DP and distribution of ((z, Z), δ)-pDP data points in linear regression with isotropic
Gaussian noise adding. Right: Comparing the pDP privacy loss to the -DP obtained through exponential
mechanism (Wang et al., 2015) using the same posterior sampling algorithm. In both experiment δ = 1e− 6.
4. Differentially privately release high-probability confidence intervals of these key quantities (by releasing
the smallest eigenvalue) and enforce the properties when needed (add regularization.)
“pDP to DP conversion” uses the high-level idea of the Propose-Test-Release framework (Dwork & Lei,
2009), which involves testing a sequence of conditions on key data-dependent quantities of the problem. Our
approach is different because we propose to directly release these key quantities and intervene (regularize)
if necessary. On the meta-level, a careful pDP analysis allows us to identify what these key quantities are
that contributes to the sensitivity. Compared to the “robust linear regression” approach (Dwork & Lei, 2009,
Section 4), AdaOPSis avoids the need to discretize Θ, hence does not require a runtime that is exponential
in dimension d.
4.3 Simulation
We conclude the case study with two simulated experiments (shown in the two panes of Figure 2). In the first
experiment, we consider the algorithm of adding isotropic Gaussian noise to linear regression coefficients and
then compare the worst-case DP and the distribution of per-instance DP for points in the data set (illustrated
as box plots). In the second experiment, we compare different notions of privacy to utility (measured as excess
risk) of the fixed algorithm that samples from a scaled posterior distribution. In both cases, the average
per-instance differential privacy over the data sets is several orders of magnitude smaller than the worst-case
differential privacy.
5 Concluding discussion
In this paper, we proposed to use per-instance differential privacy (pDP) for quantifying the fine-grained
privacy loss of a fixed individual against randomized data analysis conducted on a fixed data set. We analyzed
its properties and showed that pDP is proportional to well-studied quantities, e.g., leverage scores, residual
and pseudo-residual in statistics and statistical learning theory. This formalizes the intuitive idea that the
more one can “blend into the crowd” like a chameleon, the more privacy one gets; and that the better a model
fits the data, the easier it is to learn the model differentially privately. Moreover, the new notion allows us to
conduct statistical learning and inference and take advantage of desirable structures of the data sets to gain
orders-of-magnitude more favorable privacy guarantee than the worst case. This makes it highly practical in
applications.
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Specifically, we conducted a detailed case-study on linear regression to illustrate how pDP can be used. The
pDP analysis allows us to identify and account for key properties of the data set, like the well-conditionedness
of the feature matrix and the magnitude of the fitted coefficient vector, thereby provides strong uniform
differential privacy coverage to everyone in the population whenever such structures exist. As a byproduct, the
analysis also leads to an improved differential privacy guarantee for the OPS algorithm (Dimitrakakis et al.,
2014; Wang et al., 2015) and also a new algorithm called AdaOPS that adaptively chooses the regularization
parameters and improves the guarantee further. In particular, AdaOPS achieves asymptotic statistical
efficiency and differential privacy at the same time with stronger parameters than known before.
The introduction of pDP also raises many open questions for future research. First of all, how do we tell
individuals what their s and δs of pDP are? This is tricky because the pDP loss itself is a function of
the data, thus needs to be privatized against possible malicious dummy users. Secondly, the problem gets
substantially more interesting when we start to consider the economics of private data collection. For instance,
what happens if what we tell the individuals would affect their decision on whether they will participate in
the data set? In fact, it is unclear how to provide an estimation of pDP in the first place if we are not sure
what would the data be at the end of the day. Thirdly, from the data collector’s point of view, the data is
going to be “easier” and the model will have a better “goodness-of-fit” on the collected data, but that will
be falsely so to some extent, due to the bias incurred during data collection according to pDP. How do we
correct for such bias and estimate the real performance of a model on the population of interest? Addressing
these problems thoroughly would require the joint effort of the community and we hope the exposition in this
paper will encourage researchers to play with pDP in both theory and practical applications.
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A Proofs of technical results
Proof of Proposition 9. We first show that the first moment of pDP implies on-average stability and then
on-average stability implies on-average generalization.
Let Z ′ = [Z, z′], Z ′′ = [Z, z′′] and fix z. We first prove stability. Let S = θ|p(θ) ≥ p′(θ)∣∣Eθ∼A(Z′)`(θ, z)− Eθ∼A(Z′′)`(θ, z)∣∣
= sup
θ,z
`(θ, z)[PZ′(θ ∈ S)− PZ′′(θ ∈ S)]
≤e(Z,z′)PZ(θ ∈ S) + δ((Z, z′))− PZ′′(θ ∈ S)
≤(e(Z,z′)+(Z,z′′) − 1)PZ′′(θ ∈ S) + δ(Z, z′) + (Z, z′)δ(Z, z′′)
≤(e(Z,z′)+(Z,z′′) − 1) + δ(Z, z′) + (Z, z′)δ(Z, z′′)
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Note that the bound is independent to z.
Now we will show stability implies generalization using a “ghost sample” trick in which we resample Z ′ ∼ Dn
and construct Z(i) by replacing the ith data point from the ith data point of Z ′.∣∣∣∣∣EZ∼Dn
(
Eθ∼A(Z)Ez∼D`(θ, z)− Eθ∼A(Z) 1
n
n∑
i=1
`(θ, zi)
)∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣EZ∼Dn,{z′1,...,z′n}∼Dn
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
Eθ∼A(Z)`(θ, z′i)−
1
n
n∑
i=1
Eθ∼A(Z(i))`(θ, z′i)
)∣∣∣∣∣
≤EZ∼Dn,{z′1,...,z′n}∼Dn
1
n
n∑
i=1
∣∣Eθ∼A(Z)`(θ, z′i)− Eθ∼A(Z(i))`(θ, z′i)∣∣
≤EZ∼Dn−1,{z′,z′′}∼D2 [(e(Z,z
′)+(Z,z′′) − 1) + δ(Z, z′) + (Z, z′)δ(Z, z′′)]
The last step simply substitutes the stability bound. Take expectation on both sides, we get a generalization
upper bound of form:
ξ = EZ∼Dn(Ez∼D[e(Z,z)|Z])2 − 1 + EZ∼Dn,z∼Dδ(Z, z) + (EZ∼DnEz∼D[e(Z,z)|Z]Ez∼D[δ(Z, z)|Z].
Proof of Proposition 11. The stability argument remains the same, because it is applied to a fixed pair of
(Z, z). We will modify the ghost sample arguments with and additional change of measure.∣∣∣∣∣EZ∼Dn
(
Eθ∼A(Z)Ez∼D′`(θ, z)− Eθ∼A(Z) 1
n
n∑
i=1
ρ(zi)`(θ, zi)
)∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣EZ∼Dn
(
Eθ∼A(Z)Ez∼Dρ(z)`(θ, z)− Eθ∼A(Z) 1
n
n∑
i=1
ρ(zi)`(θ, zi)
)∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣EZ∼Dn,{z′1,...,z′n}∼Dn
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
Eθ∼A(Z)ρ(z′i)`(θ, z′i)−
1
n
n∑
i=1
Eθ∼A(Z(i))ρ(z′i)`(θ, z′i)
)∣∣∣∣∣
≤EZ∼Dn,{z′1,...,z′n}∼Dn
1
n
n∑
i=1
ρ(z′i)
∣∣Eθ∼A(Z)`(θ, z′i)− Eθ∼A(Z(i))`(θ, z′i)∣∣
≤EZ∼Dn−1,{z′,z′′}∼D2ρ(z′′)[(e(Z,z
′)+(Z,z′′) − 1) + δ(Z, z′) + (Z, z′)δ(Z, z′′)]
=EZ∼Dn−1,z′∼D,z′′∼D′ [(e(Z,z
′)+(Z,z′′) − 1) + δ(Z, z′) + (Z, z′)δ(Z, z′′)].
Proof of Corollary 12.
E
[
ED[e(Z,z)|Z]ED′ [e(Z,z)|Z]
]
− 1 + δ(1 + E[e(Z, z)]) ≤
√
EDe2ED′e2 − 1 + 2δ.
The inequality uses Jensen’s inequality E
[
E[e(Z,z)|Z]2] ≤ Ee2(Z,z) and the monotonicity of moment gener-
ating function on non-negative random variables. The statement is obtained by Taylor’s series on Ee2(Z,z).
Lastly, we use the algebraic mean to upper bound the geometric mean in the first term and then use Taylor
expansion.
Proof of Lemma 13. By the stationarity of θˆ∑
i
∇`(θˆ, zi) +∇r(θˆ) = 0
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Add and subtract `(θˆ, z) and apply first order Taylor’s Theorem centered at θˆ′ on
∑
i∇`(θˆ, zi) +∇`(θˆ, zi) +
∇r(θˆ), we get ∑
i
∇`(θˆ′, zi) +∇`(θˆ′, zi) +∇r(θˆ′) +R−∇`(θˆ, z) = 0.
where if we define ηt = (1− t)θˆ′ + tθˆ, the remainder term R ∈ Rd can be explicitly written as
R =
[∫ 1
0
(∑
i
∇2`(ηt, zi) +∇2`(ηt, z) +∇2r(ηt)
)
dt
]
(θˆ − θˆ′).
By the mean value theorem for Frechet differentiable functions, we know there is a t such that we can take ηt
such that the integrand is equal to the integral.
Since θˆ′ is a stationary point, we have∑
i
∇`(θˆ′, zi) +∇`(θˆ′, z) +∇r(θˆ′) = 0
and thus under the assumption that
[∫ 1
0
(∑
i∇2`(ηt, zi) +∇2`(ηt, z) +∇2r(ηt)
)
dt
]
is invertible, we have
θˆ − θˆ′ =
[∫ 1
0
(∑
i
∇2`(ηt, zi) +∇2`(ηt, z) +∇2r(ηt)
)
dt
]−1
∇`(θˆ, z).
The other equality follows by symmetry.
Proof of Theorem 14. Let X ′ = [X;x], y′ = [y; y]. Denote H := XTX + λI, H ′ := (X ′)TX ′ + λI, g := XTy
and g′ := (X ′)Ty′. Correspondingly, the posterior mean θˆ = H−1g and θˆ′ = [H ′]−1g′.
The covariance matrix of the two distributions are H/γ and H ′/γ. Using the fact that the normalization
constant is known for Gaussian, the log-likelihood ratio at output θ is
log
|H−1|−1/2e− γ2 ‖θ−θˆ‖2H
|[H ′]−1|−1/2e− γ2 ‖θ−θˆ′‖2H′
= log
√
|H|
|H ′|︸ ︷︷ ︸
(#)
+
γ
2
[
‖θ − θˆ′‖2H′ − ‖θ − θˆ‖2H
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(∗)
.
Note that H ′ = H + xxT . By Lemma 21,
|H|
|H ′| =
|H|
|H|(1 + µ) =
|H ′|(1− µ′)
|H ′| ,
so
(#) = log
√
(1 + µ)−1 = log
√
1− µ′.
The second term in the above equation can be expanded into
(∗) =θT [H ′ −H]θ + (θˆ′)TH ′θˆ′ − θˆTHθˆ − 2(θˆ′)TH ′θ + 2θˆTHθ
=(xT θ)2 + (y′)TX ′[H ′]−1X ′Ty′ − yTX(H)−1XTy︸ ︷︷ ︸
(∗∗)
−2y(xT θ) (11)
(∗∗) = [(y′)TX ′[(X ′)TX ′ + λI]−1X ′Ty′ − yTX(XTX + λI)−1XTy] = [(y′)TΠ′y′ − yTΠy] ,
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where we denote the“hat” matrices Π := X(XTX + λI)−1XT and Π′ = X ′[(X ′)TX ′ + λI]−1(X ′)T . Also
define v := X(XTX + λI)−1x. By Sherman-Morrison-Woodbury formula, we can write
Π′ =
[
X
xT
] [
H−1 −H−1x(1 + µ)−1xTH−1] [XT x]
=
[
Π− (1 + µ)−1vvT , v − µ(1 + µ)−1v
vT − vT (1 + µ)−1µ, µ− µ2(1 + µ)−1
]
Note that vT y = xT θˆ and 1− µ(1 + µ)−1 = (1 + µ)−1, therefore
(∗∗) = −(1 + µ)−1(xT θˆ)2 + 2(1 + µ)−1xT θˆ + µ(1 + µ)−1y2
= −(1 + µ)−1(y − xT θˆ)2 + y2.
Substitute into (11), we get
(∗) = (y − xT θ)2 − (1 + µ)−1(y − xT θˆ)2.
And the log-probability ratio is
log
p(θ|X,y)
p(θ|X ′,y′) = log
√
(1 + µ)−1 +
γ
2
[
(y − xT θ)2 − (1 + µ)−1(y − xT θˆ)2
]
= log
√
(1 + µ)−1 +
γ
2
[
(xT θˆ − xT θ)2 + 2(y − xT θˆ)(xT θˆ − xT θ) + µ
1 + µ
(y − xT θˆ)2
]
Under the distribution of θ when the data is (X,y), xT θ − xT θˆ follows a univariate normal distribution with
mean 0 and variance µ/γ. By the standard tail probability of normal random variable,
P
(
|xT θ − xT θˆ| >
√
µ
γ
log(2/δ)
)
≤ 2e
− log(2/δ)
log(2/δ)
=
δ
log(2/δ)
≤
↑
When δ < 2/e
δ.
we can calculate (, δ)-pDP for every δ > 0. In particular, under p(θ|X, y)
P(
∣∣∣∣log p(θ|X,y)p(θ|X ′,y′)
∣∣∣∣ ≥ ) < δ
for
 =
1
2
∣∣∣∣− log(1 + µ) + µγ(1 + µ) (y − xT θˆ)2
∣∣∣∣+ µ2 log(2/δ) + |y − xT θˆ|√µγ log(2/δ).
By Lemma 24 this implies (, δ)-DP.
Now, we will work out an equivalent representation of the log-probability ratio that depends on θˆ′.
Let µ′ be the in-sample leverage score of x with respect to X ′, namely, µ′ := xT [H ′]−1x. By Sherman-
Morrison-Woodbury formula
H−1 = [H ′ − xxT ]−1 = [H ′]−1 + [H ′]−1x(1− µ′)−1xT [H ′]−1.. (12)
Standard matrix algebra gives us
yTΠy = (y′)TX ′H−1(X ′)Ty′ − yxTH−1xy − 2yxTH−1XTy
= (y′)TX ′H−1(X ′)Ty′ − 2yxTH−1(X ′)Ty′ + yxTH−1xy.
Substitute (12) into the above, we get
yTΠy = (y′)TΠ′y′ + (1− µ′)−1(xT θˆ′)2 − 2yxT θˆ′ [1 + µ′(1− µ′)−1]+ y2µ′ + y2(µ′)2(1− µ′)−1
= (y′)TΠ′y′ + (1− µ′)−1(xT θˆ′)2 − 2yxT θˆ′(1− µ′)−1 + y2(1− µ′)−1 − y2
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Therefore,
(∗∗) = −(y − xT θˆ′)2(1− µ′)−1 + y2,
and
(∗) = (y − xT θ)2 − (1− µ′)−1(y − xT θˆ′)2.
The corresponding log-probability ratio
log
p(θ|X,y)
p(θ|X ′,y′) = − log(
√
1− µ′) + γ
2
[
(y − xT θ)2 − (1− µ′)−1(y − xT θˆ′)2
]
= − log(
√
1− µ′) + γ
2
[
(xT θˆ′ − xT θ)2 + 2(xT θˆ′ − xT θ)(y − xT θˆ′)− µ
′
1− µ′ (y − x
T θˆ′)2
]
Under the posterior distribution of (X ′,y′), the mean of xT θ is centered at xT θˆ′ with variance µ′/γ. We
can then derive a tail bound of the privacy loss random variable and it implies an (, δ)− pDP guarantee by
Lemma 24. Specifically, it implies that the method is (, δ)-pDP with
 =
1
2
∣∣∣∣− log(1− µ′)− γµ′1− µ′ (y − xT θˆ′)2
∣∣∣∣+ µ′2 log(2/δ) +√γµ′ log(2/δ)|y − xT θˆ′|.
This complete the second statement of the proof.
Proof of Proposition 16. The proof mostly involves applying Theorem 14 and substituting bounds over either
a bounded domain assumption (typical for DP analysis), or a model assumption of how data are generated
(typical for statistical analysis).
Proof of Statement 1 in the agnostic setting. For any x ∈ X , and any data set X, using the choice
of regularization term, we can bound µ = 1/λn. Substitute that into Theorem 14, and use the inequality that
log(1 + x) ≤ x we get the first expression.
Now, restricting ourselves to the bounded domain. Under the choice of λn, we can choose an X,y with a
singular value equal to
√
λn and the corresponding singular vector v ∈ {−1, 1}n such that the following upper
bounds are attained
‖(XTX + λnI)−1XT ‖ ≤ 1
2
√
λn
.
‖θˆ‖ ≤ ‖(XTX + λnI)−1XT ‖‖y‖ ≤
√
n
2
√
λn
.
Now choose (x, y) such that |xT θˆ| = ‖x‖‖θˆ‖, we get that sup(X,y),(x,y) |y − θˆTx| = 1 +
√
n
2
√
λn
. The DP claim
follows by substituting the upper bound into the pDP’s expression.
Proof of Statement 2 under the model assumption. To prove the second claim, note that by
Assumption (b)(d), the smallest eigenvalue of XTX is lower bounded by d/nm. Also under the model
assumption, the ridge regression estimator concentrates around θ0.
In particular, under the model assumption, the ridge regression estimate
θˆ = (XTX + λnI)
−1XT y = (XTX + λnI)−1XTXθ0 + (XTX + λnI)−1XTZ (13)
With high probability over the distribution of Z
‖θˆ − θ0‖2 = O(dσ
2 log(n)
n
+
λ2nd
2‖θ0‖2
n2
),
thus for all (x, y) satisfying ‖x‖ ≤ 1 y ≤ 1, we get
|y − xT θˆ| ≤ |y − xT θ0|+ |xT (θˆ − θ0)| = O(1 + ‖θ0‖).
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Under the assumption that n > 10d log n, ‖θ0‖ = O(1) and σ = O(1) this is effectively a constant.
For x ∈ X and y ∼ N (θT0 x, σ2), using standard Gaussian tail bound, with high probability the perturbation
is bounded, therefore |y − xT θ0|2 ≤ σ2 log(2/δ′).
Lastly, we address the case of the average pDP loss over the empirical data distribution. Besides taking into
the above bound on |y − xT θˆ|, we further consider adding the different parts over the distributions. Since
this is to deal with data points in the data set, we will instantiate the bound (8). Our assumption on γn, λn
ensures that the dominant term is the third term, thus
1
n
n∑
i=1
n((X, t), (xi, yi))
2 ≤ Cγn 1
n
n∑
i=1
(yi − xTi θˆ′)2xTi (XTX + λnI)−1xi.
Under the high probability event that the noise is bounded by σ
√
2/δ′ for all data points, we can extract
them out then note that
1
n
n∑
i=1
xTi (X
TX)−1xi =
1
n
tr(
n∑
i=1
xix
T
i (X
TX + λnI)) ≤ 1
n
tr(I) =
d
n
.
Substitute these bounds into Theorem 14, and we obtain the Statement 2.
Proof of Statement 3 under the model assumption. By (13) and the fact that OPS can be thought of
as adding an independent multivariate Gaussian noise with covariance matrix (XTX + λnI)−1XTX(XTX +
λnI)
−1/γn, we get
θ˜ = (XTX + λnI)
−1XTXθ0 +
√
1 + γn(X
TX + λnI)
−1XTZ.
By a bias-variance decomposition, we get
E(‖θ˜ − θ0‖22|X) = Var(θ˜|X) + ‖Eθ˜ − θ0‖2
=(1 + γ−1n )σ
2tr
[
(XTX + λnI)
−1XTX(XTX + λnI)−1
]
+
∥∥[I − (XTX + λnI)−1XTX] θ0∥∥2
=(1 + γ−1n )σ
2
d∑
i=1
σ2i
(σ2i + λn)
2
+ λ2nθ
T
0 (X
TX + λnI)
−2θ0
≤(1 + γ−1n )σ2tr(XTX + λnI)−1 + λ2nm−2n−2‖θ0‖2
The proof is complete by substitute the values of γn and λn into the inequality and noting that m = Ω(1)
and under the model assumption ‖θ0‖ does not grow with n. Clearly, if γn = ω(1) and λn = o(
√
n), then the
algorithm is asymptotically efficient.
Proof of Proposition 17. We will first prove the claim on differential privacy and then analyze the statistical
efficiency.
Proof of differential privacy. First of all, by Weyl’s theorem, and the assumption that ‖xxT ‖2 ≤ 1, we
get that the global sensitivity of λmin(XTX) is 1. We will use λmin as the short hand of λmin(XTX) in the
rest of the proof. So releasing λ˜min is (/2, δ/2)-DP using the standard Gaussian mechanism. Secondly, under
the same event with probability at least 1− δ/2, we have
λmin − log(4/δ)

≤ λ˜min ≤ λmin + log(4/δ)

.
Therefore, by our selection rule of the regularization parameter λn,
n
dκ
≤ λmin(XTX + λnI) ≤ max{λmin, n
dκ
+
log(4/δ)

}.
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The lower bound implies that for any (x, y) satisfying the condition, the out of sample leverage score
µ = xT (XTX + λnI)
−1x ≤ κd
n
. (14)
It also implies an upper bound on the prediction error:
|y − xT θˆ| ≤ 1 + ‖θˆ‖ ≤ 1 + ‖(XTX + λnI)−1XT ‖2‖y‖2 ≤ min
√
2dκ. (15)
We will prove the final inequality above using the following lemma with h = n/dκ and then note that
‖y‖2 ≤
√
n.
Lemma 18. For any matrix X, and any λ ≥ 0. If λmin(XTX + λI) ≥ h, then
‖(XTX + λI)−1XT ‖ ≤
√
2/h.
The proof is technical so we defer it to later.
Now combine (14)(15) with Theorem 14, we get that the OPS step which obeys (˜, δ/2)-pDP with
˜((X,y), (x, y)) ≤ µ
2
(1 + log(4/δ)) +
1
2
γn min(µ, 1)(y − xT θˆ)2 +
√
γµ log(4/δ)|y − xT θˆ|
≤ κd(1 + log(4/δ))
2n
+
γn
2
κd
n
2κd+
√
γn
2
κd
n
2κd log(4/δ)
≤ /8 + /8 + /4 ≤ /2
Note that in the last step, we made use of the choice of γn and the condition that concerns  and κ as stated
in the algorithm. Since this upper bound holds for all data set (X,y) and all privacy target (x, y). The OPS
algorithm also satisfies (/2, δ/2)−DP .
The proof of the first claim is complete when we compose the two data access.
Proof of the statistical efficiency. Now we switch gear to analyze the estimation error bound. Let event
E be the event that λ˜min > λmin −
√
10 log(n)
√
log(4/δ)
/2 , which happens with probability 1− n−10. Under E,
we have λ0 = 0. By our assumption, this happens with
Applying the third claim in Proposition 16, we get that
E[‖θ˜ − θ0‖2|X,E] ≤ (1 + γ−1n )σ2tr((XTX)−1).
Under the small probability event Ec, we use a crude upper bound that takes the sum of the maximum
square bias and maximum variance.
E[‖θ˜ − θ0‖2|X,Ec] ≤ (1 + γ−1n )σ2tr((XTX)−1) + ‖θ0‖2
by law of total expectation, for an event E
E[‖θ˜ − θ0‖2|X] = E[‖θ˜ − θ0‖2|X,E]P(E|X) + E[‖θ˜ − θ0‖2|X,Ec]P(Ec|X)
≤ (1 + γ−1n )σ2tr((XTX)−1) + P(Ec)‖θ0‖2 = (1 + γ−1n )σ2tr((XTX)−1) +O(n−10).
The proof is complete by substituting γn into the bound.
Proof of Lemma 18. Take SVD of X = UΣV T , we can write
‖(XTX + λnI)−1XT ‖2 = max
i∈[d]
Σii
Σ2ii + λn
25
We now discuss two cases. First, for those i ∈ [d] such that Σ2ii ≤ λn. In this case, adding λn on both sides
ensures that
h ≤ λmin(XTX + λnI) = λmin + λn ≤ Σ2ii + λn ≤ 2λn.
and therefore if Σii > 0
Σii
Σ2ii + λn
=
1
Σii + λn/Σii
≤ 1
2
√
λn
≤
√
1/(2h). (16)
The final inequality is also true for Σii = 0. If on the other hand, for those i ∈ [d] such that, Σ2ii > λn. This
time by adding Σ2ii on both sides, we get
2Σ2ii > λn + Σ
2
ii ≥ λn + λmin = λmin(XTX + λnI) ≥
n
κ
.
This implies that
Σii
Σ2ii + λn
≤ 1
Σii
≤
√
2/h. (17)
Combine (16) and (17) we get
‖(XTX + λnI)−1XT ‖2 ≤
√
2/h
B Technical lemmas
Lemma 19. Let θˆ′ = (XTX + E1)−1(Xy + E2) for any matrix E1, E2.
θˆ′ − θˆ = (XTX + E1)−1(E2 − E1θˆ)
Proof.
θˆ′ =(XTX + E1)−1(XTy + E2)
=(XTX + E1)
−1(XTX)(XTX)−1XTy + (XTX + E1)−1E2
=θˆ +
[
(XTX + E1)
−1(XTX + E1)− (XTX + E1)−1E1 − Id
]
θˆ + (XTX + E1)
−1E2
=θˆ − (XTX + E1)−1E1θˆ + (XTX + E1)−1E2
=θˆ + (XTX + E1)
−1(E2 − E1θˆ)
Lemma 20 (Sherman-Morrison-Woodbury Formula). Let A,U,C, V be matrices of compatible size, assume
A,C and C−1 + V A−1U are all invertible, then
(A+ UCV )−1 = A−1 −A−1U(C−1 + V A−1U)−1A−1.
Lemma 21 (Determinant of Rank-1 perturbation). For invertible matrix A and vector c, d of compatible
dimension
det(A+ cdT ) = det(A)(1 + dTA−1c).
Lemma 22 (Weyl’s eigenvalue bound (Stewart, 1998, Theorem 1)). Let X,Y,E ∈ Rm×n, w.l.o.g., m ≥ n.
If X − Y = E, then |σi(X)− σi(Y )| ≤ ‖E‖2 for all i = 1, ..., n.
Lemma 23 (Gaussian tail bound). Let X ∼ N (0, 1). Then
P(|X| > ) ≤ 2e
−2/2

.
26
Lemma 24 (Tail bound to (, δ)-DP conversion). Let (θ) = log( p(θ)p′(θ) ) where p and p
′ are densities of θ. If
P(|(θ)| > t) ≤ δ
then for any measurable set S
Pp(θ ∈ S) ≤ etPp′(θ ∈ S) + δ.
and
Pp′(θ ∈ S) ≤ etPp(θ ∈ S) + δ
Proof. Since log( p(θ)p′(θ) ) = − log(p
′(θ)
p(θ) ) and the tail bound is two-sided. It suffices for us to prove just one
direction. Let E be the event that |(θ)| > t.
Pp(θ ∈ S) = Pp(θ ∈ S ∪ Ec) + Pp(θ ∈ S ∪ E) ≤ Pp′(θ ∈ S ∪ E)et + Pp(θ ∈ E) ≤ etPp′(θ ∈ S) + δ.
Lemma 25 (Matrix Hoeffding inequality (Mackey et al., 2014)). Consider a finite sequence X1, ..., Xn
of independent random and self-adjoint matrices with dimension d and A1, ..., An be a sequence of fixed
self-adjoint matrices. In addition, let EXi = 0 and X2i  A2i almost surely for all i = 1, ..., n. Then, for all
t ≥ 0
P
{
λmax(
n∑
i=1
Xi) ≥ t
}
≤ de−t2/2σ2
where σ2 ≤ ‖∑ni=1A2i ‖.
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